


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# West Europe Report

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13 December 1982

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

No. 2072

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## ROOTS OF TERRORISM: INTERNATIONAL TIES

Paris L'UNITE in French 1 Oct 82 p 17

[Review by Claude Glayman of book "Vivre avec le terrorisme: le modèle italien"  
[To Live With Terrorism: the Italian Model] by Marcelle Padovani, published by  
Calmann-Lévy]

[Excerpts] "We created an ideological and humane climate which gave rise and sustenance to terrorism. Our failure as a group left a void which was filled by people who took seriously that which for us were mere slogans shouted during demonstrations and which they translated into bloody acts..." Thus speaks the son of a victim of Italian terrorism; he too belongs to a group about which much has been written, Lotta Continua.

It is Marcelle Padovani who lets him speak in a recent and excellent book "To Live With Terrorism: the Italian Model" (Calmann-Lévy). I could not recommend this book enough, so complex and serious is its subject matter: Documentation and thought, readability and concern for the essay as well as for the document are its qualities. Very political, I would even dare to say ideological--in the better sense of the term--the author is affirmative: Italian terrorism did not win, not so much because it was defeated on its own ground, violence, but because the Italian people, particularly the working class of the peninsula, did not accept in any way its sought-after goals, namely the revelation, despite itself, of the fascist and repressive nature of western democracy.

The fact that trade unions made the fight against terrorism one of their most important tasks is enough. At a time when modern and industrial states are unable to confront each other militarily, within their societies, direct and implacable confrontation with the masses does not exist, if it ever did lastingly.

Opportunely recalling the famous controversy between Marx and Bakunin, Marcelle Padovani shows well that in our part of the world--undoubtedly not in the Third World to which there is not enough direct or indirect reference in this essay--violence took refuge with the individual: It passed from the public to the private domain. We are confronted by a challenge which is firstly individual, even though the author indicates that, during the last decade, several successive generations of terrorists cropped up with various motives; a self-defense reflex in the face of fascism was the start of terrorism, a residual movement but no longer so much a mass movement since Mussolini's and Hitler's defeat.

Whence this picture of a contemporary nihilism described by Marcelle Padovani, that chills all the more as the painting is, so to speak, attempted from within, thanks particularly to the a posteriori testimonies of penitent people: "In short, the choice of terrorism appears to result from a lack of culture and want of horizons which, this time, is truly related to nihilism." It is a portrait of a marginality arising within total incommunicability which erects the immediate and finally anti-historical gratification of needs as a dogma, the whole culminating in the deliberate act of killing.

The picture of the young proletarianized student opposed to the unionist is thus sketched. The latter is represented and stigmatized as the last form of the state defender, after the judge, first corrupted, then honest, after the insignificant foreman or, it goes without saying, the honorable political leader about whom there would be a lot to say (cf the culminating offensive of terrorism in the Aldo Moro affair of 1978) and the explicit analysis of Christian Democracy). It is an interstitial society with an undertone of consumerism, typical of Italy. It combines the country's economic unbalance between an ultra-modernist thrust and the maintenance of total underdevelopment, a background of Mafia and Camorra (Naples) and a fantastic ethical decadence permeating the whole and giving rise, nevertheless, to a cultural vitality totally unknown in France (in some way, the concrete climate of these concepts is well described in the novel which the very talented Dominique Fernandez devoted to Pier Paolo Pasolini "Dans la main de l'ange" [In the Angel's Hand], published by Grasset; however, the homosexual angle is excessively portrayed).

Contesting the international connection of Italian terrorism, even if she does not deny the many foreign interferences and solidarities, Marcelle Padovani emphasizes in passing--a fact which preoccupies us to the utmost--the presence of this internationalization in France, where Paris is said to occupy a strategically key place. By deduction, we wander about the consequences of the choice made by the Italian Communist Party in favor of the "historical compromise;" the upsurge of terrorism; and the consequences which the arrival of the Left to power could have in France. The Left of the Left could be tempted to use violence and to do so. We are forced to note that we have not yet reached that point, if we ever will. In this respect, it is the only weakness of this book which, a little too cursorily, merely describes the supposed similarity between the Italian antileft terrorism and the "new philosophy" which is also antileft but terrorist in spirit if not in action. It may be a fertile intuition but it is poorly developed. In any case, it appears to abstract too much the basis of the antitotalitarian denunciation contained in the "new philosophy," even if the latter actualized, with the varnish of marketing, already ancient, but by no means devalorized, theses. The fact that terrorism is antileft does not prevent in any way communism from being totalitarian. It is nothing more than an additional contradiction in an intellectual field which does not lack them.

This book also provides memorable edifying portraits of flesh and blood Italian terrorists: Antonio Savasta linked with the Moro affair; the penitent Patrizio Peci whose brother was killed in retaliation; criminologist Giovanni Senzani, who pointed out his colleagues to murderers; spoiled Donat Catin, a terrorist of noble birth who could not stand the integrity of honest Judge Emilio Alessandrini; the young and seemingly sweet Maria Petricola, etc. They are our contemporaries; discover them. It is our society which produced them but also fought them, and with what success,

as proved by the recent kidnaping of General Dozier. A very passionate chapter is devoted to the antiterrorist fight. Marcelle Padovani states that its effectiveness stems from the fact that often conservative strongmen, like General Chiesa (recently killed by the Mafia) or Gaspare de Francisci, turned their very own methods against the terrorists, not excluding torture. For the capitalist society always defends itself, even if the political democratic regime it gave itself is, to be sure, greatly imperfect; however, to paraphrase a famous saying of Winston Churchill we do not know a better representation.

6857

CSO: 3519/121

## ECONOMICS MINISTRY NOTES SUCCESS OF DISTRICT HEATING

Bonn DIE WELT in German 13 Oct 82 p 11

[Article by Gisela Reiners, Bonn: "Expensive Network Investments--Large Startup Losses"]

[Text] The Federal Ministry of Economics calls the development program for coal-fired power stations and district heating, which started in late 1981, a "success." The Federal Government and the Laender each contributed one half of the sum of 1.2 billion, and so far have identified more than 200 projects and project plans totaling "clearly more than DM 5 billion." About 60 projects with a total investment of DM 1.1 billion have already been approved by the Federal Government and the Laender, for which investment subsidies of up to 35 percent will be paid.

According to the Economics Ministry, the expansion program is the follow-on program for development under the Investment-in-the-Future Program [Zukunfts-Investitions-Programm] (ZIP) that expired in 1981. Under that program, subsidies in the amount of DM 730 million, mobilized a total of 2.6 billion for the investments. The projects will be completed by 1984/85.

These Federal and Laender development programs aim at

- stimulating investments in district heating (600 million came from a 7.5-percent investment subsidy),
- promoting through subsidies the construction of coal-fired heating plants or the conversion of oil-powered plants to the use of coal, and
- inducing house and apartment owners to convert their central heating systems to district heating by offering them a 25-percent subsidy or special tax write-offs.

Swift expansion of the district heating program, the ministry notes, as well as increased use of industrial waste heat are among the "energy policy goals that have been accorded a high priority by the Federal Government." Especially in densely populated areas, important reserves could be utilized to save energy and to provide oil substitutes, ensure larger supplies, and improve the use of domestic coal.

However, at times there would be economic and locational problems: network investments would be expensive, efficient utilization of new networks could

only be accomplished on a step-by-step basis over several years and involve considerable startup losses. For this reason, extensive subsidies had been granted for many years. As a result, connections of district-heat customers have jumped by 18 percent since 1978--that is the equivalent of about 600,000 housing units. At this time district heating makes up 8 percent of the domestic heating market, i.e., a good 2 percent of total energy consumption. Compared with conventional heating methods, district heating would achieve energy savings of 4 million tons of hard coal units--a very respectable quantity, according to the Economics Ministry. Besides, the program would obviously act as a tremendous stimulant to further development.

7994

CSO: 3620/56

## GOVERNMENT SUDDENLY WORRIED ABOUT CREDITWORTHINESS ABROAD

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Nov 82 Sect III p 1

[Article by Frank Dahlgaard]

[Excerpt] Denmark has now for 19 years had a permanent balance of payments deficit, and during all these years we have been assuring our foreign lenders that we would soon improve and discontinue our policy of borrowing. Our foreign creditors have now begun to doubt Denmark's credibility, and that is why the minister of finance has been on a tour to the large American banks.

It is a well-known matter that Denmark's international creditworthiness has suffered some serious setbacks of recent months.

The foreign financial press has represented Denmark as a country on the brink of bankruptcy on a line with Rumania, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and the Royal Danish Mortgage Bank suffered the humiliation last August of not being able to sell its bonds at reasonable prices in West Germany.

Ever since it came into power, the new government has been making persistent efforts to improve Denmark's bad reputation abroad.

## OECD Policy

Last October, the government thus invited journalists from the international press to Denmark to enable them to obtain clear information on our economic situation. The message to the journalists was: It is true that Denmark's situation is serious, but we are, after all, not yet a developing country on the verge of bankruptcy.

(Incidentally, the foreign journalists had occasion to attend the dramatic session of the Folketing on Saturday, 16 October, when the entire incomes policy of the government hinged on Mogens Glistrup's mercy and pity.)

## Henriques' Bank

When, last October, economists from the International Monetary Fund paid a routine visit to Denmark, they, too, were given a thorough briefing on the

changed situation. The same thing applied to OEGD Secretary-General Jonkheer E. van Lennep, whom the government invited to this country in early November. He was gratified to ascertain that Denmark has largely embarked on the policy recommended by the OECD in its most recent report on Denmark.

With a view to further strengthening our creditworthiness, Minister of Finance Henning Christophersen recently went to New York, where he explained Denmark's situation and the measures of intervention adopted in the areas of cost-of-living allowances and public finance to the directors of the major U.S. banks. Henning Christophersen also visited the creditworthiness analysis institute of Standard & Poor, which has put Denmark on a special 'observation list.'

#### First Time

As far as is known, this is the first time for a Danish minister of finance to visit our foreign creditors on his own initiative with a view to discussing and explaining Denmark's situation. At the end of this month, the minister of finance will travel to West Germany to similarly strengthen our creditworthiness with the major banks in that country.

#### 'The Danish Disease'

There is no doubt that the Danish creditworthiness crisis has been more serious than was hitherto assumed. One of the major reasons why the situation has come to a head is the fact that the major international banks this year received several nasty shocks due to the difficulties of large borrowing nations, such as Mexico, Argentina, Poland, and Rumania, in servicing their debts.

Under these circumstances, international financiers have become very reluctant to lend money to nations already in debt. And it cannot be denied that Denmark belongs among such nations.

The goodwill trip of the minister of finance to the United States did not yield any tangible results. Henning Christophersen thus did not manage to persuade the creditworthiness analysis institute of Standard & Poor to remove Denmark from the 'observation list.' The reason probably is what in financial circles in London is referred to as 'the Danish disease.' The term implies that only extremely modified versions of plans and proposals presented for reorganization and stabilization of the economy are adopted.

Denmark has had a permanent foreign exchange deficit for the last 19 years, and throughout that period we have been assuring the rest of the world that we would improve our position and discontinue our policy of borrowing. Our creditors now want to see results before they believe us.

In the present situation, they want to see the budget adopted in December, and they want to see the outcome of the collective bargaining this winter. Till then we shall remain on the 'observation list.' Incidentally, as the only country.

7262  
CSO: 3613/25

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION LEADER SEES END TO CRISIS SITUATION

Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 27 Nov 82 Sect III p 1

[Article by Flemming Højbo]

[Text] "We have passed the turning point in the crisis of our agriculture," says Martin Nielsen, chairman of the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association, after the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association has changed a deficit in 1981 of 81 million kroner into profits of 50 million kroner during the first 10 months of the present year.

The leaders of the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association state that the agricultural sector is again making progress on account of the improved terms of trade of agriculture, a number of political measures of intervention, and a good harvest of grain as well as feedstuffs.

The turnover of the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association was 5.2 billion kroner during the first 10 months of the year. That is 14 percent more than last year. The volume traded of raw materials, grain and fertilizers has thus increased by up to 8 percent, while the sale of mixed fodder has declined correspondingly. The losses on debtors have dropped recently. The losses are now considerably lower per month than estimated.

Compared to last year, the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association has reduced its foreign loans by 400 million kroner to 1.2 billion kroner.

According to Bent Hansen, managing director, the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association expects to regain a net capital of 153 million kroner lost last year.

Bent Hansen, incidentally, expects a number of structural changes within the feedstuff trade, following the agricultural crisis of the last few years. He says that 10-15 major cooperative feedstuff societies will have to change their structure, so that the societies will not concentrate exclusively on retail trade but will also be interested in wholesale trade. Increased decentralization of the Danish Agricultural Feedstuff Association will, according to Bent Hansen, also be necessary in the coming years.

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CSO: 3613/25

ECONOMIC

DENMARK

BRIEFS

FOREIGN BORROWING NEED FOR 1983--Next year, the state and the municipalities will be borrowing approximately 2 billion kroner each month. These are the plans on which the Ministry of Finance is working and which formed the background to Minister of Finance Henning Christophersen's goodwill trip to the major American banks recently. On 24 and 25 November, the minister of finance will, incidentally, continue his tour with a visit to our foreign creditors in West Germany. Bendt Hansen, president of the Commercial Bank, who is the spokesman for the state advisory loans syndicate, tells BERLINGSKE TIDENDE that we shall, indeed, be able to borrow the necessary funds but that it will take 8-10 years for the Danish economy to be put back in order. The government's intervention so far is a mere beginning, says Bendt Hansen. He states that the foreign banks will want to see the budget adopted in December before deciding whether to give Denmark 'better grades.' [Text] [Copenhagen BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 17 Nov 82 p 1] 7262

CSO: 3613/25

## DBG ATTACKS BLUEM, DEMANDS EMPLOYMENT PROGRAM

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 25 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by Hugo Mueller-Vogg : "Labor Unions Deny Grace Period to Federal Government. Kohl and Bluem not Very Popular in Dortmund--100,000 Protest"]

[Text] Dortmund 24 Oct--These days, the key word "unified labor union" turns up in nearly all speeches delivered by top DGB [German Trade Union Federation] functionaries. Whenever they protest against what they call "the dismantling of social programs," they emphasize the DGB's independence from party politics. In so doing, they manage to bestow on their own words the appearance of having risen above party politics and an aura of infallibility. In addition, it is designed to repudiate accusations that the DGB mobilizes labor against the coalition party and the Free Democrats.

Hence it was of the unified labor union that the chairman of the DGB Land region of North Rhine Westfalia spoke before more than 100,000 demonstrators in the center of Dortmund. "We support a unified labor union," Geuenich stated, while confirming that the "final position of the unions" on the new government had not yet been formulated. Because it is not important how it was created but what "its actions" are. There is no doubt that, at this time, the new government is not yet able to show any actions, but only intentions at best. But even these seemed bad enough to make the labor unions stick to the schedule they had established in early September for protesting the budget cutting plans of the old coalition.

Although it is unique for Germany to call on workers to take to the streets only 2 weeks after a government proclamation, the speakers in Dortmund were eager to prevent the whole matter from becoming a clear kickoff meeting for the upcoming Bundestag election campaign. Neither Geuenich nor the second main speaker, the "steel politician" of IG Metall [German Metal Workers' Union], Judith, threatened the new coalition with the election ballot. They left no doubt of their view that the new coalition is "already siding with the employers." And, therefore, cannot expect a grace period from the labor unions. After all, Judith said, organized labor does not demand anything different from Kohl than what they had previously demanded from Schmidt: decisive measures against unemployment and an effective job program.

However, although not a single reference was made to 6 March, one could sense in the beer and steel city that the election campaign had begun. This

was less a result of attacks on the FDP that have become a staple of labor union rallies in that district ever since the debate over codetermination in the coal, iron and steel industries. Rather, Judith did not say a single word about the economic policy of the Social Democrats in the 13 years preceding "Operation 83" when they were the ruling party. In his view, "the employers ran the cart into the morass." The explanations Geuenich was able to offer were not quite so simple. Nevertheless, he managed to get himself to speak very vaguely of a "shrinking cure in recent years" and accused the SPD's one-party government in Duesseldorf of having slowed somewhat the tempo of its new indebtedness in 1982.

While Judith and Geuenich conducted an election campaign which made no mention of certain issues, the demonstrators showed less reticence. Especially Labor Minister Bluem, the "Opel worker with a doctorate," (as Alfred Dregger calls him), does not fit into the political mold of many labor unionists who expect only the rich to be in the CDU. Thus one could see many more anti-Bluem slogans, such as the not-very-original pun that the workers would not let themselves be "Kohl-ited" [workers would not have the wool pulled over their eyes]. While Judith acknowledged that the labor minister, as a member of the IG Metall, would be able to woo "the majority in the organization," signatures were being collected at the meeting in support of Bluem's expulsion from the union.

It could neither be overlooked nor ignored that the union protesters had learned a fast lesson from ex-Chancellor Schmidt. While Schmidt threatened his former coalition partner with the "rake" [gave him a piece of his mind], a large display board in Dortmund showed a little flower [Bluemlein] being threatened by a sharp spade. If Schmidt is suddenly suffering from a dislike of people living in elegant homes, bankers' wives taking their lap dogs for rides in the company car, served Judith as a symbol of the unjustifiable fiscal policies of the CDU/FDP government.

The initial plan had been play up their demands for increased codetermination during the weekend demonstrations. While Geuenich did not mention the codetermination campaign with a single word, Judith devoted a mere 3 percent of his 34-page speech to it. Judith treated the topic of peace with the same brevity, when he expressed the view that the DGB's Dm 50 billion employment program "could be financed up and down" by buying some fewer Tornadoes and battle tanks. Many demonstrators, more pointedly than the speakers themselves, referred to the alleged linkage between unemployment and defense policy. The DGB youth organization demanded more opportunities for education and training "instead of Pershing and cruise missiles." The DKP youth organization "argued" on a some even more plainly on a banner that was about 20 meters wide: "Jobs, Not Rockets."

The Socialist German Workers Youth was not the only political organization that had attached itself to the DGB rally. Numerous other communist groups participated in the march, citizens' groups protesting hostility to foreigners, and feminists. Indications were that the organizers were equally undisturbed by the fact that signature lists of the "Krefeld Appeal" were circulated during the demonstration. Even the Greens were part of the scene, providing a clue to Brandt's "new majority."

## FIRST SIGNS OF CHANGE IN OETV POLICY NOTED

Duesseldorf WITTSCHAFTSWOCHE in German 8 Oct 82 pp 27, 30

[Article entitled: "A Change at Bottom and Top"]

With government coffers empty, the Public Service, Transportation and Communications Labor Union (OETC) will be led by a woman, Monika Wulf-Mathies, in the coming wage talks. The first signs of an altered strategy are being noted.

Siegfried Merten, OETV deputy chairman, looked bitter and angry. As the 632 delegates and the top functionaries on the podium at the extraordinary union congress in the Rhine-Main auditorium gave the outgoing OETC chief, Heinz Kluncker, a standing ovation last Wednesday, Merten remained spitefully sitting. A few moments before, the 54-year-old East Prussian, who had worked his way up the hierarchical ladder of the union rung by rung, had been narrowly defeated in a crucial vote by Kluncker's favorite, the union's fast-rising professional, Monika Wulf-Mathies.

"The Fat One," as Kluncker was always affectionately and respectfully called by his associates, announced his retirement on doctor's orders on 2 June and left as his bequest his recommendation that Mrs Wulf-Mathies be his successor. The OETV second deputy chairman, Karl-Heinz Hoffmann, felt that this alone would certainly "have led to a searing ordeal and unbearable tensions." The board therefore also nominated Merten.

The occasionally shirt-sleeved Merten would, to be sure, have appealed to the Bavarians more on the basis of his disposition. However, as Erwin Walter from Rosenheim explained the swing in the voting, "We need a chairman who can negotiate skillfully in these difficult times."

Merten's criticism of the savings resolutions of the social-liberal coalition ("muddle-headed") and the announcement of his intention to make up for all of that in the coming wage talks "by hook or by crook," which would have imposed an additional burden on the workers, scared off even the Goeppinger delegate Hans Hohlbauch: "With traditional wage policies, demanding 6 percent and only getting 2 percent, you can't tempt anybody to get out of the house any more."

It was also no longer of any use to Merten when he conjured up the old times and spoke of unforgotten membership meetings at the local and regional level, recalling the solidarity of the trade unionists "in action." For Hartmut Jungermann, honorary member of the OETV board, the election of Monika Wulf-Mathies as the new OETV chairman signifies the beginning of a new era: "The generation change at the bottom eventually had to break through at the top."

In this respect the academic--she studied Germanistics, history and economics --who was born in Wernigerode in the Harz in 1942, is more representative than the typical trade union secretary of the cast of a Siegfried Merten. Monika Wulf-Mathies lacks the "stable smell." She joined the union only in the 1970's after she was transferred from her position as an expert in the Federal Economics Ministry to the chancellor's office under Willy Brandt. There she established an OETV local; this brought her so much recognition that in 1976 she was elected with the largest number of votes as the sole woman on the managing board of the OETV, with responsibility for social and health policies as well as for the women's secretariat and religious employees. The positive membership development precisely in these areas is credited to her: 27 percent of the OETV members are women.

A cool, analytical intellect is hidden behind the gentle smile of the new OETV manager. Even though she is a convincing master of the vocabulary of the emotion-laden opinion-maker ("if incorrigible capitalists pursue a total strategy of conflict, they must reckon with the unrelenting resistance of the unions"), she would choose the foil as her weapon rather than the saber.

Stamina, genius and determination are the weaponry that she believes she is bringing with her. In wage negotiations she "could sit through long nights just as well as anybody else." At least the new minister of the interior might be able to adjust to this as easily as to a harder OETV approach if it comes to a disruption of the autonomy in wage negotiations. She understands the coalition agreement on the civil service wage scale as a call to battle in which strikes would not be excluded.

Meanwhile the starting position for the young OETV chief is rather new, with the sequence of blows reversed. For the past several years the wage agreement in the public service came first; it was then largely carried over to the civil service. If Bonn now denies the wage framework for the civil servants in advance, this significantly narrows the negotiating scope of the OETV. With an eye on the high unemployment, the dwindling government coffers and the broad security of employees in the public service, Monika Wulf-Mathies knows that not only will strike actions be viewed by the public with mistrust but colleagues in the other unions expect restraint.

She herself believes that she has learned from her professional experience "that we can only represent the interests of our colleagues effectively if we exercise an increased influence on political decisions." It is too late for protests after decisions have been reached in parliament.

Monika Wulf-Mathies' strategy stresses social policy. A bar must be placed on the "more and more brutal tendencies toward rationalization, the rigorous

reductions-in-force and the increase in the work tempo." She still sees additional possibilities for mobilization in negotiations on reduction in work time and on working conditions for long-distance truck drivers and employees in the religious field as well as on putting a stop to the shifting of services to the private sector at the local government level.

Moreover there can no longer be a division of labor between those "who plan actions and those who then have to carry them out." Where spectacular consequences of protest strikes or work stoppages are not to be expected, it would be appropriate to document joint solidarity. According to her statement, the main forces of the front-line troops will be shifted; fewer blue-collar workers but more of the office workers among the nearly 1.2 million OETV members could be called up. Of course, the OETV chief feels that she herself has been called up. The events surrounding the "New Homeland" still weigh on the mood of the rank and file. By "correct behavior and social impulses," Monika Wulf-Mathies emphasizes, the call of the common welfare must be reinforced and the "antisolidarity discussions" ended.

Her first scratch test will confront the trade union lady at the latest when the negotiations with the employers on the supplemental old age payments for office workers and workers in public services begin. Her tactics will be determined by the dividing line between the achievable and the constraints of her own status. In this regard the old trade union bosses of the cut of a Heinz Kluncker had it easier.

9827  
CSO: 3620/50

ECONOMIC

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

BRIEFS

FDP AGAINST RHINE-MAIN-DANUBE CANAL--Chancellor Helmut Kohl promised his close friend Franz Josef Strauss to continue the construction of the Rhine-Main-Danube Canal. But his new liberal partners want to prevent him from keeping his word. FDP delegates Hans Guenter Hoppe, Klaus Gaertner, and Wolf-Dieter Zumpfort want to vote in the Budget Committee against further spending on the economically unsound and ecologically harmful canal. The FDP budget experts--both friends and foes of the new coalition--agree on one thing: What they denied Chancellor Schmidt, they do not want to approve for Chancellor Kohl either. Gaertner: "I don't know anything of a coalition agreement concerning the canal." [Text] [Hamburg DER SPIEGEL in German 18 Oct 82 p 140] 7994

CSO: 3620/56

## IMPORTS FROM SOVIET UNION EXPECTED TO INCREASE IN 1983

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 3 Nov 82 p 12

[Text] "Finnish imports from the Soviet Union will increase next year. Oil importation, for example, will rise to 8 million tons. There will also be increased importation of certain chemicals."

This announcement was made by Deputy Secretary of State Ake Withol in Moscow last Tuesday following the second round of negotiations concerning trade next year.

However, he stressed they are only halfway through the negotiations and that the last round will be held in Helsinki at the end of November and early December. "We hope to sign the agreement by the middle of December," he said.

The emphasis of the negotiations in Moscow has been increased Soviet exports to Finland in order to reduce the trade imbalance. The imbalance has been growing steadily in the last couple of years. Earlier this fall it amounted to 5 billion marks--i.e., the value of Finnish imports was 5 billion markka less than its exports to the Soviet Union.

Withol emphasized, however, that there would hardly be a complete balance of trade in the near future, but he said the negotiations had gone well--despite difficult circumstances.

"Finland will be able to import all the oil it needs next year from the Soviet Union, about 8 million tons," he said. The possibility of purchasing oil for further exportation to Third World countries had been discussed, but no agreements were reached.

Among other goods, Finland will primarily import greater amounts of chemicals.

"We will double our importation of ammonia. Likewise, we will import more apatite and potassium chloride, i.e., raw materials for chemical fertilizers, as well as methanol and a few other chemicals. The import quotas for copper and lumber will also go up," said Withol.

He admitted that Finland would have liked to buy a number of other goods in large quantities, but that the Soviets did not agree to the proposals. Among the goods mentioned were sugar, rye and salt.

Ake Withol did not want to go into any detail about Finnish exports to the Soviet Union. But he emphasized the government is trying to maintain the present levels of trade so that individual firms would not suffer.

He also touched on the issue of increased importation of natural gas, but pointed out that the pipeline would have to be extended in that case.

"Likewise, the price of gas would have to come down," he said, and admitted that increased gas importation would not completely wipe out the trade imbalance since a solution of that kind would automatically lead to reduced importation of other fuels from the Soviet Union.

9852  
CSO: 3650/34

## GOVERNMENT PLANS SELECTIVE RESPONSE TO EEC

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 4 Nov 82 p 1

[Text] Ankara--In response to EEC restrictions on certain Turkish goods, the government is considering company-level measures instead of "global retaliation." This policy, formulated by the State Planning Organization [SPO], is gaining support at the government level. It is reported that the final decision on the issue will be made by Minister of State Refik Pasin.

According to information received, the proposed policy is based on the conclusion that "targeting the EEC for direct retaliation will not be effective under the current conditions." Officials said that if Turkey imposes import embargoes or quotas against EEC countries which are applying restrictions on Turkish goods certain key sectors in Turkey will be adversely affected. The officials gave Oyak-Renault as an example and said: "A global retaliation measure against France in response to T-shirt restrictions, for example, could hurt Oyak-Renault's imports. Consequently, the loser would again be Turkey. Considering such drawbacks, ways must be sought to win company-level support and to pressure the Community, if necessary, in order to neutralize the EEC restrictions."

SPO officials said that long-term measures taken at the company level to counter the restrictions will mean that the "main burden" will be born by the exporters. The officials said that consideration is being given to setting up a fund to support "lobbying" within EEC companies and that these "lobbies" will work to "create disincentives" for EEC organs which are implementing protectionist policies against Turkey.

While the "retaliation" proposals against the EEC are being reshaped at the government level a "final decision stage has not yet been reached." The SPO proposal is reportedly favored by Minister of State Refik Sermen Pasin.

#### Bilateral Talks to be Emphasized

In another development, at the meeting organized by the Clothing Apparel Manufacturers' Association in Odakule it was decided to continue official talks with the EEC Commission and to emphasize bilateral talks. Also, the need was stressed to insure that European firms with ties to Turkish chambers of industry and companies pressure their governments to lift the EEC sanctions. Another issue that was taken up at the meeting concerned short-term measures to keep the Turkish clothing manufacturing industry "on its feet." Delegates who spoke at the meeting dwelled on the need to postpone maturing loans and to freeze interest rates on credit loans and demanded that export loans for which applications have been made be transferred to clothing manufacturers as soon as possible.

## PITFALLS, PROPOSALS ON MEAT EXPORTS GIVEN

Istanbul DUNYA in Turkish 8 Nov 82 p 2

[ "Experts' View" column by Hami Kartay: "Problems and Proposals in Meat Exports" ]

[Text] The overcoming of our country's economic bottleneck and the expansion of its development with new resources can only be possible by closing the gap between our imports and exports and establishing a balance between the two. This basic principle has been the cornerstone of the economic policy that has been implemented for the past 2 years. In other words, measures have been taken to encourage exports and to broaden the horizons of the exporters. However, certain implementations which nullify correct decisions and well-meaning efforts and which hurt the entrepreneur's feeling of confidence in the long run may hamper the results expected from exports.

The incentive measures are essentially guarantees given by the government to the entrepreneur and the exporter. One important characteristic of these guarantees, which are an expression of a certain commitment, is the confidence about their continuity. If these incentive measures are frequently altered with provisions that may hurt the entrepreneurs or the exporters, this confidence may be lost, and the desired results may not be obtained from exports and investments.

Meat is one of Turkey's key export products. The regulations, decisions and directives issued since the beginning of May 1982 in connection with this export product, which is being frequently discussed recently, are concrete examples of the foregoing concerns. Below, I give these examples related to meat. I believe that it would be proper from a perspective of the development and expansion of our exports, on which we have placed so much hope, to study these examples which are related to only one sector in a manner to include all other sectors.

The examples are:

1. The Circular No 82/4 published on page 19 of Issue No 17685 of the Official Gazette of 5 May 1982 determined floor prices for export beef and went into effect on the date of its publication. According to this circular, frozen beef would be sold at \$2,450 per metric ton, f.o.b., as of 5 May 1982. About a month after this decision about floor prices, Circular No 82/7 was published on page 37 of Issue No 17719 of the Official Gazette of 9 June 1982. According to this circular, the floor price of \$2,450 would not be applicable beef export contracts

signed before the publication of Circular No 82/4 on 5 May 1982.

2. One of the elements of the incentive measures for meat exports is tax returns in exports. A list showing tax return rates for various export products was published on page 2 of Issue No 17139 of the Official Gazette of 23 April 1981. Exporters bid prices for their overseas contracts on the basis of these tax return rates. In Section 1 of this list, the tax return rate for meat exports was specified as 20 percent. Many exporters signed meat export contracts with several foreign countries for 1982 on the basis of these figures. They even actually exported some meat. However, the Export Incentive Directive No 82/7 published on page 22 of Issue No 17707 of the Official Gazette of 28 May 1982 reduced the tax return rate on meat exports from 20 percent to 5 percent effective from the date of the publication of the directive. At the time this decision was taken, bidding was under way for thousands of tons of meat overseas, and many exporters were on their way to make their own bids unaware of the upcoming directive. After only a week, a correction hidden among lines appeared on page 22 of Issue No 17714 of the Official Gazette of 4 June 1982 stating that the tax return rate on meat exports was changed from 5 percent to 15 percent. The issue did not end there. Those fond of playing with meat changed the tax return rate on meat exports yet again in Directive No 82/9 published on pages 21 and 22 of Issue No 17754 of the Official Gazette of 14 July 1982. According to Article 4 of the directive, the tax return rate on beef exports would be reduced from 15 percent to 10 percent as of 1 October 1982 and the tax return rate on mutton exports would be reduced from 15 percent to 5 percent as of 1 January 1983.

3. Slaughtering methods constitute one of the most important issues in meat exports. Production of quality products and extraction of economic value from byproducts is possible through the upgrading of primitive slaughterhouses into integrated meat processing plants. Despite persistent resistance from bureaucrats still fascinated with etatism, a law amendment published on page 22 of Issue No 17722 of the Official Gazette of 12 June 1982 opened the way for the establishment of private sector meat processing plants. However, skillful maneuvering on the part of the bureaucracy has put off the implementation of this amendment until such time as a governing statute for the amendment is issued. As a result of these bureaucratic obstructions, many entrepreneurs have been unable for the past year to put their investments, worth millions of Turkish liras, into work despite the incentive documents in their hands. We have interesting examples on hand in this connection. We now wonder who is going to pay for the cost of delaying the construction of processing plants that would produce quality meat products if it were not for the wait for the issuance of the governing statute.

In the light of the foregoing summary of issues, the concerns and problems of meat exporters can be expressed as follows:

--Frequent changes in measures supposed to be incentives are turning them into disincentives particularly since they embody unfavorable implications.

--In view of the fact that the set floor prices are higher than world prices and that tax return rates are being reduced, it is becoming harder and even impossible to enter foreign markets.

--The injustices suffered by our meat exporters in foreign contracts despite the fair prices they have bid and the fact that they are disqualified from bidding must be rectified through bilateral agreements in a manner that will protect the rights of our exporters.

--The fact that the air freight rates of meat buyer countries is lower than our rates is an issue that warrants careful consideration. Furthermore, loading inadequacies in some of our airports and freight reservation improprieties and uncertainties must be eliminated.

--Delays in the payment of export tax returns are causing problems for exporters having solvency difficulties.

--The gradual reduction in the finance guarantee rates in the use of export loans is having a discouraging effect and is forcing commercial banks to agree to harsh credit terms.

--The exportation of live animals, which is causing major losses to the economy of our country, must be stopped except for cases such as animals for ceremonial sacrifices.

--The slaughter of animals before the middle of June, which is the time of peak demand for meat, must be banned.

--Meat producers must be encouraged, supported and trained in order to increase the meat product yield rate and the total production.

To the degree that these steps are taken, meat, which we call "red petroleum", will undoubtedly occupy a key place as a foreign currency resource.

9588  
CSO: 3554/50

ECONOMIC

TURKEY

BRIEFS

BAN ON FRENCH IMPORTS--Ankara--In retaliation for the measures taken by France against goods imported from Turkey, the Turkish government has completely suspended all imports from France except for "extremely essential materials." The memorandum defining Turkey's reaction toward France's attitude was handed to the French ambassador yesterday by Sermet Refik Pasi, minister of state for foreign economic relations. It was stated in the memorandum that all imports from France had been suspended, except for certain essential materials. [Text] [NC030755 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 30 Nov 82 p 5]

CSO: 3554/71

## EFFECT OF GOVERNMENT CHANGE ON RELATIONS WITH POLAND WEIGHED

Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 27 Sep 82 p 12

[Text] Warsaw, September--A change of government in Bonn may affect the state interests of Poland. Until now that had been the handiest slogan in the propaganda campaign launched in Poland after the fall of the Bonn SPD/FDP coalition. Furious emotions were displayed, particularly in the party organ TRYBUNA LUDU. If the Union parties take power, the likelihood will grow that rightist and revanchist forces in the Federal Republic will cooperate with the propagandists of the adventurist policy from the United States, the party organ writes. It is indeed a fact, this article says further, that the revanchist and anti-Polish leaders of the West German expelle organizations grew out of the Union. "Christian Democracy is the most anti-Polish and revanchist political force in the Federal Republic." The daily SLOWO POWSZECHNE of the Catholic lay organization Pax, which is nevertheless true to the party line, maintained in recent days that the impending change of government fed Polish fears. While the author does not of course believe that the new government would touch existing agreements, there are grounds for concern over the prospects for preserving the spirit of these agreements. All papers express fears of a worsening of bilateral relations, even those that like the Warsaw daily, ZYCIE WARSZAWY, warn against loud lamentations before the installation of a new Bonn Government.

The propagandists blare their anathemas generally in vain at the public. There is even some evidence that the party press has so little credibility that the readers assume more the opposite of what they must read daily to be true. But in questions regarding the German-Polish relationship, this conclusion cannot be so easily drawn. Even if one can speak of a stable relationship--and in the younger generation (and Poland is generally a young people with respect to average age) even of a relationship--between the two peoples marked by friendly links, historical experience can be easily remobilized beyond the Oder. And even if one observes among many young people in Poland that their fears are directed more toward their eastern neighbors than toward the Germans, this momentarily unencumbered relationship must always be confirmed and strengthened.

A change of government is considered a matter of course and quite normal in countries experienced in democracy. But even freedom-loving people yearning for democracy, such as the Poles, are inexperienced in such matters.

The break in a continuity of many years appears to them per se as unusual and threatening. One suspects that there is more behind it than a normal and legal occurrence in government procedure. Polish party propaganda can now fill this supposition with its ominous croaking. It thus fulfills its "duty" by diverting people from the internal catastrophes with a search for enemies abroad. It is generally known in Poland that the West German expelle organizations are no longer interest groups capable of influencing policy. But the still not fully healed loss of eastern Polish areas to the Soviet Union leaves open the parallel feeling that some people in the Federal Republic may feel the same about Silesia or East Prussia. This is seen as a threat to the basis of the Polish state. Violent speeches by officials of the expelle lobby therefore never fail to be heard in Poland.

The Polish Catholic Church has rendered the greatest service to reconciliation of Poles and Germans. Through its hands pass most of the West German relief supplies, which have been firmly engraved in the consciousness of the Polish nation. Through a joint pontifical service of the Polish and German episcopacy before the ikon of Jasna Gora and then through the joint appeal for the canonization of the Polish Father Maximilian Kolbe, murdered by the Nazis, the good and problem-free relations between Polish and German Catholics have been displayed. The visit of Primate Glemp to the German Catholic Congress should have a similar effect. Such events are incomparably more effective with the Polish population than the howls of propaganda these days but a false gesture by the new Bundestag could destroy much.

Unfortunately the party politicians of the Union, in contrast to the Social Democrats, can hardly claim old political friendships in Poland. Only a few Union politicians have gone to Warsaw in recent years; the visits of Kiep and Barzel long since past are not unanimously remembered fondly. Tactical clumsiness and weaknesses in the relations between the German and Polish partners in the talks were particularly revealed during Kiep's visit. Still unclarified is the incident of the invitation and disinvoitation of the CSU chief, Strauss. After the imposition of martial law on Poland it became clearer that the Federal Republic is conducting its eastern policy within the framework of the EEC. But the Polish Government, which can hardly make a move in foreign policy, presumes that even the EEC can conduct foreign policy only in agreement with Washington and that the dependency on the United States can only be strengthened by a Union faithful to the Atlantic treaty. From Warsaw's point of view the idiotic assumption that the American government was behind the fall of the old coalition has a kernel of truth. Forcibly imposed alliance-thinking in the east and the Polish gift of making political combinations in jack-rabbit jumps encourage such imaginings.

There is clearly less cursing in the Polish Government over the change of government in Bonn than in the press. But the interest in events in Bonn is great. Foreign Minister Olszowski gets detailed briefings. Some voices in Warsaw have already speculated that this new Polish foreign minister, with his pragmatism and robustness, his intelligence and purposefulness, will find an equal negotiating partner in a possible new West German foreign minister, Strauss. In addition the Polish Government displays the same reserve, the same calm, which the Kremlin also shows toward the change of government in Bonn.

Still no one in Warsaw today will exclude the possibility of new impending burdens on the German-Polish relationship. But they speak of problems that can be quickly overcome. A gesture or a diplomatic note or a clear sentence in the new government statement could let the hasty propagandists in the Polish press dry their ink. No doubt should be left that the new Federal Government will act on the basis of concluded agreements and that Bonn has a continued interest in keeping the bilateral relationship free of historical debts. No one in Warsaw doubts that the new rulers in Bonn will also disapprove of social oppression and martial law in Poland. Still there is an impression that during the past few months the West German mission in Warsaw has had a little better time of it than some other NATO embassies. To this extent the relationship between the Federal Republic and Poland has relaxed, not only between the peoples but also between governments. This capital should not be squandered.

6108  
CSO: 3620/16

## OBSERVER SEES DANGER OF 'PARLIAMENTARY FINLANDIZATION'

Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Swedish 2 Nov 82 p 2

[Article by Axel Waldemarson]

[Text] Lennart Bodstrom is about to embark upon a Nordic odyssey. Many people here at home believe that Sweden's foreign policy is the most important among the Nordic countries. Naturally, we do not want to minimize our position, but there is also reason to stress the greater role which other Nordic countries can play in certain situations.

Thus, the Danish foreign minister, Uffe Elleman-Jenssen, is going to Lebanon and Jordan on Thursday. He is making that trip as spokesman for political Europe, the 10 EC countries. Denmark has assumed the EC chairmanship for a year. In other words, Denmark has a much different position than Sweden in the halls of power. Thus, in many decisive situations we are outside the real decisionmaking. As a consequence of this, we can have in other situations a significant role.

Now the Nordic circle is not without interest. Initially, Bodstrom--and it can change--will only be dealing with nonlabor foreign ministers: Par Stenback in Helsinki, Uffe Elleman-Jenssen in Copenhagen, Svenh Stray in Oslo and Olafur Johannesson in Reykjavik.

Bodstrom's trip begins in Finland which is experiencing a constitutional crisis at the same time as the maneuvering in foreign policy is widening.

I have dealt with the constitutional crisis a couple of times. During the Kekkonen era the communists were permitted on a couple of occasions to vote in parliament against the government in which they were represented. Now the communists and the People's Democrats are refusing, in the same situation, to assume any responsibility for the Sorsa's government economic policy.

Kivisto, the SKDL chairman and minister of education, can visualize abstaining. It is not yet certain what the communists will do. They might vote against. In either case the situation is equally bad.

The crisis is not just parliamentary. It involves the impression the world will have of Finland. A Center newspaper LOLLI writes with regard to the

criticism which has appeared in this column: "Unfortunately SVENSKA DAGBLADET is not completely wrong. There must be a limit to what one can and cannot do in the government. What has happened in reality justifies very wide conclusions."

The conclusions are easier to understand if one looks at a statement by a representative of the majority in the Communist Party, that is, not the directly antigovernment statements. Kati Pelpola, a member of parliament, stated frankly in a speech that SKDL is not in the habit of surrendering an instrument of political power even if it has become a minority on an important question. HELSINGIN SANOMAT states that this is a frank revelation of the communist strategy of preparing a Leftist revolt in a nonlabor state set-up or attempting to overturn society.

It would obviously be dangerous if people outside Finland got the impression that the communists and the People's Democrats can behave any way they want and still remain in the government.

I myself have never actually used the term "finlandization," originally a fighting word in West German internal political debates. Matters have now gone so far that Johannes Koroma, the editor-in-chief of UUSI SUOMI talks about "our finlandized parliamentary system" in his column: "Finlandized parliamentarianism is to conduct politics as it actually was initiated during the Urho Kekkonen era, and as it has continued even more strongly during the prime ministerships of Mauno Koivisto and Kalevi Sorsa, and which includes the exclusive right of the communists to vote against the government's most important decisions."

The most important aspect from the Swedish side is the profound debate which the communist gamble has caused.

The debate is a hopeful sign for any one desiring to see in the 3rd republic, that is, Koivisto's Finland, a more healthy parliamentarianism. Practical action must follow if "parliamentary finlandization" is harmful to Finland's reputation in the world.

There should be with the 3rd republic a livelier debate on foreign policy. There is not much to say about the fact that in some cases it has not been very much on the ball. The maneuvers of the spokesman for the Center Party, Johannes Virolainen, has aroused the most attention.

In the first place, he permitted himself to be elected chairman of the Interparliamentary Union with the support of the Arab countries. Virolainen held up the prospect that Arafat would be invited to Finland. The visit did not, however, materialize.

In the second place, Virolainen has, as president of the Union, visited Poland and met General Jaruzelski. In both cases Virolainen ignored Foreign Minister Par Stenback.

It will not be very good if Finland's No 2 man, Virolainen, is forced to deny the rumor that its No 1 man, Koivisto, had encouraged him, despite everything, to extend an invitation to Arafat.

One could possibly have expected the president to react more strongly. It is, nevertheless, not hard to understand the import which the following subtle formula cloaks: There should not be any "direct uncertainty as to what system we have and whose business it is to evaluate international questions for the state."

According to the constitution, this is the president's task, and it is perhaps symptomatic that a columnist in the Center Party's chief organ SUOMENMAA writes: "People active in the Center Party will surely support the president's efforts to broaden foreign policy discussion in Finland and to conduct it in a civilized manner without Finnish democracy and its ability to function being jeopardized. At the same it should also be said that Center Party people will understand if the president intervenes with stronger measures than before if the foreign policy pirouettes perhaps continue as they have."

It is obviously in the Nordic interest that Finland's foreign policy role is not misunderstood.

6893  
CSO: 3650/45

## NEW COUNTRIES BEING ADDED TO LIST OF FOREIGN AID RECEIVERS

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADSBLADET in Swedish 5 Nov 82 p 17

[Text] Yesterday the cabinet came to a decision about the amount of Finnish aid to developing countries for the next 3 years. Foreign Minister Par Stenback said that if the grants continue to grow at the present rate, Finland could possibly reach the goal of 0.7 percent of the gross national product within the designated time.

At the general session of the United Nations in September it was suggested that Finland could possibly reach the goal of 0.7 percent of its GNP before the end of this decade.

Countries which are now receiving aid from Finland are still included in the bilateral development aid proposal accepted by the government yesterday. They are Egypt, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Vietnam and Zambia.

Over the next 3 years these countries will get a total of 1,060 million markkas, 85 million of which will be in loans. Tanzania will receive the largest amount of development aid, 295 million markkas, 5 million of which in loans.

There have been no cuts in aid to any of the above countries from a year ago.

On the contrary, aid to Tanzania will be increased from 59 million markkas this year to 90 million next year. Present development-aid program countries will get about 64 percent of Finland's total development aid.

For the next 3 years, the total amount of Finnish development aid will be 1,665 million markkas, one sixth of which will be in loans.

#### Least Developed Get 30 Percent

The least-developed countries will get 30 percent of the aid. Tanzania is among them and is also included in the present development-aid program countries. Tanzania alone will receive close to 18 percent of all of Finland's aid to least-developed countries. The remaining 12 percent will be divided between Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Nepal, Somalia and Sudan. This is the first time Nepal qualifies for aid from Finland.

The government's decision was based on a promise made by Finland at the UN conference in Paris last year to reserve 0.15 percent of its GNP for aid to developing countries.

#### Choice of Countries

Several criteria are used in selecting a country to receive development aid.

"We must know something about the country so that we do not suddenly enter into a completely strange land. In general, that nation's government practices shall be in accord with the principles of balance in our foreign policy," said foreign minister Stenback.

"Language, of course, is another criterion so as to be able to communicate."

#### Three-Year Aid Limits

According to a proposal by TALKE [Economic Foreign Relations Delegation], the cabinet also decided to enter into a program designed to aid Burma, Mozambique and Peru. These countries will receive 157 million markkas during the next 3 years. This amount includes 86 million markkas in loans.

Nicaragua will also qualify for aid during the 1983-85 period based on a TALKE recommendation. This grant amounts to 35 million markkas, most of which, 27 million, will be in loans. About 11 percent of bilateral aid to developing nations has been earmarked for these countries during the next 3 years. It was suggested that the decision about Nicaragua be made following a vote within TALKE.

The rest of the aid, which is not designated for any specific country, amounts to 76 million markkas.

#### Finance Committee's Recommendations

The government finance committee recommended that no more than two thirds of the bilateral development aid grants for 1984 and 1985 be made contractually binding before the middle of 1983.

Moreover, the finance committee supported the foreign minister's proposal with respect to the distribution of bilateral aid, but recommended that the final decision on the distribution of the remaining share of the grants not be made until next May.

The authorization to sign binding contracts for the full amount of aid has been limited by a report from the finance ministry to the effect that government loans might run as high as 11 billion markkas next year.

In order to break the vicious circle in regard to government loans and increased government debt, the finance ministry wants to establish some freedom of action with respect to government spending in the next few years, according to the finance committee's reasoning.

Stenback did not take into account the finance ministry's "normal procedure of later delaying payments and saving money."

The foreign minister pointed out that the finance ministry's decision could mean that Finland will not reach the official goal of 0.7 percent of the GNP in development aid before the end of this decade.

#### TALKE Delegation

Last Thursday the cabinet appointed the Economic Foreign Relations Delegation; Par Stenback will continue to be the chairman of that delegation.

However, the delegation is smaller than it used to be. It now consists of 11 members and 11 deputies, compared to 20 of each before. The following were appointed deputy chairmen of the delegation: Editor -in-Chief Johan von Bonsdorff (Finnish People's Democratic League); editor Lauri Kontro (Center Party); parliamentary representative Lasse Lehtinen (Finnish Social Democratic Party) and Professor Erkki Bergman; Director B. O. Johansson; international secretary Seppo Kallio; parliamentary representative Ilkka Kanerva and political candidate Unto Vesa.

8952

CSO: 3650/34

KIVISTO'S HANDLING OF DEVALUATION JEOPARDIZES SKDL VIABILITY

Helsinki HUFVUDSTADTSBLADET in Swedish 15 Oct 82 p 2

[Editorial by Jan-Mangus Jansson: "To Have One's Cake and Eat It Too"]

[Text] The Prime Minister neglected to provide guarantees so that the recommended compromise would hold in all SKDL [Finnish People's Democratic League] groups, and Kalevi Kivisto overestimated his strength. Many things suggest that Sorsa should have gone back to the more determined attitude he had at the beginning of the conflict, writes Jan-Magnus Jansson.

Wednesday evening Kalevi Sorsa and Kalevi Kivisto explained with relaxed smiles that the government crisis was over. This announcement was not exactly surprising, after people were aware that Kivisto, once he had come home, would apply all his strengths to eliminate the crisis from the world. But people were hardly prepared for "solutions" produced so soon and for Kivisto to be able to convince his splintered and recalcitrant comrades to take in their sails.

It turned out that the SKDL leaders had also overestimated their strength. When the matter came before the SKDL parliamentary delegation, the group decided after a vote to postpone the whole thing and start over when there would be "more careful reports" about the effects of devaluation, especially about the sociopolitical measures to be taken to compensate families with children and those with low incomes. The decision has the strong taste of a protest against the Wednesday evening compromise, and particularly against Kivisto's share in it. In the worst case it could imply the start of a new period of negotiations, about the length and duration of which no one knows anything.

It is significant for the splintering and the bad mood within the party that in addition to the minority communists, who had formed a solid core among those who worked against Kivisto's compromise, also a large part of the majority communists joined the ranks of the dissatisfied. The fact that Kivisto himself does not belong to the Communist Party and that the party's new chairman, Jouko Kajanoja, has shown himself to have a very unsteady hand means that matters are now being driven by the wind.

The whole course of events, first the conduct of the SKDL ministers in regard to the handling of the devaluation and its effects, then the sudden and dramatic capitulation in the face of Kivistö's exhortations, and finally the new repetition of yesterday, make one ask the question of whether the SKDL of today is at all capable of functioning as a government party. It is obvious that there was no real majority behind even the compromise that Kivistö conjured up on Wednesday, although it can be imagined, naturally, that the party may [yet] be made to support the government formally through some new manipulation.

Kivistö is a man of vision, and it was easy to understand the political core of his message on Wednesday evening. He gives priority to continued cooperation among the parties of the Left before everything else. This is a continuation of the line he pursued in the spring of 1981, when he helped save Kivistö's government during the complicated crisis when the Prime Minister stood against the President. In the presidential election of 1982 he continued the line when most of his electors, obviously with his blessing, gave their votes to Kivistö already on the first ballot. By "pasting" the SKDL as tightly as possible to the Social Democrats, Kivistö wants to insure a continual cooperation of the Left in the government. At the same time, he is attempting to improve his own standing and that of his little "socialist" group within the SKDL.

Prime Minister Kalevi Sorsa seems to have fallen quite easily [in line] with the orders that Kivistö issued. First of all, the agreement made with the SKDL by no means implies what would have been normal from the parliamentary standpoint, namely that the SKDL should promise to vote for the government's proposal. This government party promised only to refrain from voting against the government (besides, the promise does not affect in practice the minority communists in the opposition). That the Prime Minister accepted such a half-loaf was repugnant parliamentarily, but one can perhaps understand that in the present situation he did not want to press Kivistö to the extreme.

Secondly, and in practice worse, the Prime Minister neglected to make sure that the SKDL promise would hold in all cases. His overoptimism was shown in the fact that he himself was traveling abroad while the other organs of the SKDL and the Communist Party were taking positions on the package. Now we have found ourselves in a position where vital questions about government cooperation and economic policy were involved while the Prime Minister was in Malta and the Minister of Finance was tracked down on Wednesday in Samarkand.

Another unusual feature in the attempt to resolve the crisis was the fact that the bourgeois parties in the government were practically excluded from the process, even though the Prime Minister did keep in contact with a few of their leading representatives. In the new and more complex phase which will probably follow the decisions of the SKDL groups, the center parties should participate more actively than [they did] in Wednesday's proceedings, which turned into a duet for Sorsa and Kivistö.

It rests mainly with the Prime Minister to draw the lessons from the situation that has developed. Viewing [the situation] broadly, he has only

two options: to begin time-consuming negotiations on the social package, as recommended by the SKDL, with no guarantees about their attitude on the main questions, or to insist that the SKDL take a position on devaluation and the measures already agreed to before further negotiations can take place. Many things suggest that Sorsa should return to the more determined attitude he had at the beginning of the conflict. The aim of the SKDL is obviously a variation of the classic trick of having one's cake and eating it too, i.e. to sit in the government and work against its measures in critical situations. That is a difficult trick that will hardly succeed in the long run.

9611  
CSO: 3650/22

## PAPER EXPRESSES SKEPTICISM OVER BODSTROM'S 'ZONE' COMMENTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 4 Nov 82 p 2

[Editorial by Olof Santesson: "Nordic Freedom from Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] Lennart Bodstrom will make his first more collected contribution as Swedish foreign minister at visits to the Nordic capitals. The subject is a Nordic nuclear-free zone.

In 1981 the Swedish parliament asked for Swedish readiness in the field, among other things through continued committee work; contact should be kept with neighbors. Not much has happened since then. Swedish security political experts have on the whole been rather negative at the thought of a nuclear-free zone, among other things for the reason that a formal agreement could open the door for pressure on Sweden from the super powers.

When the Social Democrats now in government return to the zone question, their different statements are not totally unanimous, lightly speaking. Disarmament delegate Maj-Britt Theorin was the first to attract attention. She is supposed to have said in an interview that the Baltic--being an open sea--cannot, in the same way as national territories, be a part of a nuclear-free zone; Theorin had thus contradicted the statement that disputed what both the leading Social Democrats and the nonsocialist government had said on the question.

Before the Theorin interview, Olof Palme had, according to LE MONDE, said that he thought a nuclear-free zone should include the Baltic--in keeping with his earlier statements. The other day TT broadcasted a statement by the undersecretary of state for foreign affairs, Pierre Schori, that the Baltic, according to the government, shall be part of a nuclear-free zone in the North. Whereupon Foreign Minister Bodstrom at his first stop, Helsinki, says that he has not maintained as an absolute condition that the Baltic--as an open sea--must be part of a nuclear-free zone. It was, according to him, only a strong wish that the states along the Baltic shore could unite in refraining from using ships carrying nuclear weapons.

Possibly uniting these different statements is the fact that the Social Democrats do not, as fully as the nonsocialist parties, demand Soviet measures as a prerequisite to the formation of a nuclear-free zone. All the large parliamentary parties consider formal agreements, which can lead to counter demands from the super powers, to be incompatible with the Swedish policy of neutrality.

Obviously, some Social Democrats think that the Nordic states, by simply announcing the formation of a nuclear-free zone, will take its own political initiative. What Schori says, according to TT, is that the zone presupposes an international climate of relaxation and disarmament. Ullsten, in his time, counted on the zone being preceded by agreements between the super powers.

Bodstrom has not met any difficulties in discussing the zone in Finland. It may be tougher in Norway and Denmark whose governments are hardly eager for a zone argument within NATO.

A nuclear free zone cannot make the North completely protected from devastation even if tension was eased in Northern Europe; there would still be nuclear weapons that could reach our countries. There seems, however, to be plenty of time for discussion of this. The actual zone will unfortunately--whatever we wish--wait.

9843  
CSO: 3650/36

## BODSTROM PLEDGES STEPPED UP EFFORTS ON BALTIC-AREA NUCLEAR ARMS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 12 Nov 82 p 6

[Article by Magdalena Ribbing: "The Fight Against Nuclear Arms Must Be Stepped Up"]

[Text] "The knowledge that there are more nuclear arms in the Baltic area than known earlier must increase our efforts to diminish the threat of nuclear weapons against Swedish territory," said Foreign Minister Lennart Bodstrom in the Swedish parliament, when he last Thursday spoke on a nuclear free zone in the North.

It was Eva Hjelmstrom, Communist Left Party, who had asked the foreign minister about what the government is doing to bring about a Nordic nuclear-free zone. Lennart Bodstrom could in his answer refer to the government declaration that especially expressed the desire for agreements that could make the North into a nuclear-free zone.

"It is our judgment that such agreements can relieve tensions between blocs and lessen the risk of countries being exposed to a nuclear attack," said Lennart Bodstrom.

"The work between the Nordic Social Democratic parties and the labor unions in the zone question is also important," said Lennart Bodstrom, who observed that the question has received a more popular anchorage.

There was no opposition from the questioner, Eva Hjelmstrom, who thought the active work by the government in the zone question was a positive thing--very different from the time of the in-between government, she said.

Eva Hjelmstrom wanted to know if the government intended to appoint the five-party-commission the Communist Left Party has demanded several times to work on the question of making the North into a nuclear-free zone. Lennart Bodstrom answered no.

"We are not planning such a special commission. We feel that the zone question can be successfully discussed in the foreign affairs committee where now all the parliamentary parties are represented."

A larger debate on the zone question will be held in the Swedish parliament on 22 November.

## SOCIALIST YOUTH GROUP PURGES ADDITIONAL LEFTISTS

Stockholm DAGENS NYHETER in Swedish 7 Nov 82 p 8

[Article by Peter Sandberg: "SSU Expels 80 members"]

[Excerpts] Around 80 more members of Sweden's Social Democratic Youth Organization (SSU) are threatened with expulsion. They are accused of connections with the publishing association OFFENSIV. Among the evidence are notations which the SSU chairman in Gothenburg has taken from OFFENSIV members.

OFFENSIVE is a newspaper that was started in Umea in 1973 by SSU members with a background in academics. It is by its members considered to be a socially radical paper, intending to speak for socialism within SSU.

The political opinion of the paper is certainly a great deal to the left of that SSU, but still within the frames of what is discussed in the organization, say the members.

The leadership of SSU has a totally different opinion of OFFENSIV and sees it as a cover for a Trotskyite movement which functions by infiltrating and taking over an established party. The phenomenon is called "entrism" and was launched by, among others, Trotsky, who urged followers to infiltrate the French Socialist Party and work there.

#### Whole Club

The first expulsions occurred in 1976 when the most prominent members of OFFENSIV, Arne Johansson and Andrs Hjelm, were expelled.

Since then there have been a few more rounds of expulsions.

Now it is time again, and the SSU districts around the country have asked the organization leadership to expel around 80 members. In the Gothenburg district it is, for example, a question of around ten members and in actuality a whole club. Other members of SSU Partille have been encouraged to join other clubs, and in practice a whole club will be expelled.

### "Not Nice"

The latest evidence against the members of OFFENSIV has been collected by Peter Ohlsson, chairman of the Gothenburg district of SSU, by taking OFFENSIVE member Anders Berntsson's private papers.

"I know a couple of ordinary SSU members who shared an apartment with Berntsson," says Ohlsson. "Once when he was not at home, I sneaked into his room and searched through the stacks of papers. What interested me I took, copied, and returned."

"I have no great regret for this. Of course it was not particularly nicely done, and the district leadership does not back me up. But on the other hand, the activity of OFFENSIV is so dirty and the papers were so revealing that it was worth it," says Peter Ohlsson.

### Secret Meeting

The papers he considers of value are mostly handwritten notations from different meetings.

"There are among other things notations from secret meeting in Stockholm on May 22-23 this year. It is divided into three parts. First a political discussion about 'the crisis of capitalism' and other things they usually talk about."

"Then a discussion about tactics and organization. One speaks openly about 'our entrism', to 'control clubs', recruiting members 'to our trend', and other issues it has even denied using."

"The third part is an international review by Bob Laby, editor of OFFENSIVE's English counterpart. He goes through Europe country by country, reporting on the advances of the organization. In Sweden it is supposed to have 140 members," says Peter Ohlsson.

### Witch Hunt

Anders Berntsson denies being at a meeting in Stockholm at the time mentioned and ever meeting Bob Laby.

"They must be notations from some local meeting, but I have not been able to look through the material," he says.

He, and other members of OFFENSIV, says that this is a witch hunt for SSU members whose crime is to be more radical than the SSU leadership and thus troublesome.

"A congressional decision was made that it was incompatible with membership in SSU to be active in OFFENSIV. I have since then not sold the paper nor acted as a contact for it. As far as I know, there is no secret organization. I have, however, written a few letters to the editor, but that can have no more connection with the paper than when I write to a nonsocialist paper," says Anders Berntsson.

Independent of what he says, he will, however, be expelled when the leadership of the SSU organization meets next Friday. The leadership hopes that through the coming expulsions they will be free of OFFENSIV members in the organization.

9843  
CSO: 3650/36

## STATE SECRETARY ON RELATIONS, DISAGREEMENTS WITH UNITED STATES

Zurich NEUE ZUERCHER ZEITUNG in German 30 Oct 82 pp 25-26

[Text] On the occasion of the general assembly of the Swiss Marketing Society in Zurich, Raymond Probst, state secretary in the Swiss Foreign Affairs Department, spoke on Swiss-U.S. relations. He thereby made some in part critical observations on U.S. nonproliferation policy in the nuclear area, as well as on American market regulation mechanisms across national borders--for example, in securities trading, antitrust law or in the "extraterritorial application of the natural gas pipeline embargo." In the framework of as a whole very friendly relations Switzerland must at times be able to defend itself against an American embrace, "when out of their sense of mission with their achievements, the perfection of which is not doubted in their minds, they are all to impetuous in their desire to draw us closer to themselves."

Following an historical introduction into Swiss-American relations seen as "friendship with occasional tensions," Probst embarked on an illustration of nuclear and nonproliferation policy, whose goal since Eisenhower's 1953 program has been to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons without simultaneously diminishing a state's freedom to use nuclear energy peaceable. Under Carter the United States took a hard position, which in part discarded the basic position prevailing since 1968 in the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and which sought to reserve sensitive nuclear technologies for a very small circle of states (nuclear weapons powers and possibly Euratom and Japan). This policy, which uses pressure and coercive measures to restrict the peaceful use of nuclear energy, was legally established in the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act. Probst pointed out counterproductive effects of such restrictions, which contradict the intention and purpose of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Thus, the waiting time for American approval of nuclear transactions has increased from a few weeks formerly to 2 years. Discrimination in the peaceful rather than in the military area, said Probst, would be unacceptable for Switzerland even without the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, but especially so after we became a part of it.

According to Probst, the desired nonproliferation for military purposes could better be achieved through cooperation in the peaceful area. To be sure, a rethinking process has begun under the new administration. In the case of India, with the 1978 law the United States itself precluded any cooperation,

but since that time it has introduced France as a substitute for providing nuclear material. And although Reagan may want to put through an amendment which would again give the Americans themselves more international latitude, he still must count on a sizeable hardliner-opposition in Congress. A turnaround, then, is not in sight, although sensible pragmatic solutions again seem rather more likely.

Probst then discussed problems resulting from the merging of economic spheres and from the fact the "out of the internationalization of markets the United States feels obliged to conclude that it must also extend the regulating mechanisms to enterprises registered abroad, as long as these companies take part in the American market, influence it or are tied to the United States through their corporate structure. Firms with transatlantic operations can thereby get involved in highly unpleasant situations "between the American hammer and the national anvil of their country of registration," said Probst.

He illustrated that with the example of securities trading, where thanks to bilateral talks between Switzerland and the United States, at the end of August it was possible to find a solution meeting the legitimate interests of both states. Before that there had been a specific danger for Swiss banks handling American securities of either a violation of Article 273 of the Swiss penal code because of the American demand for information on clients in market transactions, or that they could be required to pay enormous fines in the United States or even be excluded from the American certificates market. The possible effects can be measured through the volume of stocks and bonds traded by Swiss banks in the United States, amounting to about \$8.5 billion (stocks) and \$337 million (bonds) during the first half of 1981.

Transatlantic legal conflicts result not only in the case of internal problems, but have also shown up in the area of raw materials markets and can potentially affect a number of Swiss firms when it is a question of American agencies' "insatiable appetite for information," especially in tax matters.

Conflicts also result when American market regulation norms are meant for direct regulation of the behavior of foreign market participants across borders. On the one hand it involves antitrust law, with which American ideas on competition are transplanted abroad, and on the other hand it involves laws and regulations having the objective of "putting through American foreign policy views abroad," for example, in that companies registered in European countries are to be hindered in providing components for the Siberian gas pipeline.

Involved in the case of antitrust law, which years ago was a matter of intense concern for the Swiss watch exporting industry, are the effects in operation or the question of how strong these effects need be to establish the jurisdiction of the affected state's courts. According to Probst, in this regard the practice in the United States is still quite unclear and gives the enterprises little legal certainty for decisionmaking.

In the case of the extraterritorial application of the natural gas pipeline embargo, the problems arise from the fact that the United States continues to issue laws and regulations whose line of attack is foreign policy, and it attempts to apply them not only domestically, but also abroad. Probst believes that this tendency results from a mixture of power politics and sense of mission, as well as mistrust of multinational companies suspected of transferring to a foreign subsidiary production not allowed according to American law. That is why the prohibition on supplying pipeline components was extended to foreign companies when just 20 to 25 percent of their capital stock is controlled by Americans. Probst characterized this company-oriented definition of embargoed enterprises as "rather overdone."

Probst indicated damage to companies, but also possible violations of the 1966 OECD guiding principles for multinational companies. In addition, it is disturbing to a state when it must observe how another state uses investments as a transmission belt for foreign policy concepts. To be sure, thus far the Swiss economy has hardly been affected by the laws motivated by foreign policy. However, the circumstance that now mere foreign licensees are also foreseen could "in the future also cause problems for purely Swiss processing companies," added Probst.

However, seen over the long run Probst did in the end seem optimistic, because a commission established by the American Congress to study the entire set of questions is showing a tendency to consider the viewpoints of the other Western industrial countries. In view of possible solutions to pending questions, the memorandum of understanding agreed on last August with Switzerland in the area of insider trading may be characterized as a milestone.

9746  
CSO: 3620/64

## TSIP DEFENDANTS REJECT GOVERNMENT INDICTMENT

Istanbul CUMHURIYET in Turkish 26 Oct 82 p 7

[Text] At the first hearing of the TSIP [Turkish Socialist Workers Party] trial on 11 October, Cemal Ozden, the party's provincial leader in Sivas and a member of the party's general executive council, rejected the charges in the government indictment in a 16-page statement he read during his questioning.

Stating that he prepared the statement with his co-inmate, Abbas Ozay, a member of the party's provincial executive council in Sivas, Cemal Ozden said: "I studied the indictment carefully. I did not find a single charge that is attributed to my person as the penal code would require. The indictment contains no evidence of any charges directed against my person. The indictment evaluates the political existence of TSIP from a perspective of key party documents and the party's policies and directs charges against the corporate body of the party. Then it wants to punish a real person on the basis of charges directed against a corporate body. Legally, this cannot be done."

Ozden noted that the TSIP was formed on 16 June 1974 and that no legal action was taken against the party from that date until 12 September 1980. Stating that charges were brought against the party after 12 September, Ozden said: "Legally, nothing should have changed. If there are any changes, they are political; the political conditions have changed. A trial which could not be held on an unchanged legal basis is being held on the basis of changed political conditions. Consequently, this indictment looks more like a statement by an adversary party than a legal document."

Noting that the indictment charges the party with inciting anarchy and terror, Ozden said that the TSIP opposed such acts and that the party stated in all its meetings and publications that anarchy and terror can only help the enemies of democracy, that they cannot in any way help the working class and the people and that they will weaken democracy.

Alleging that all the charges contained in the indictment are baseless, Ozden emphasized the charge about dividing society into classes and segments and said: "It is obvious that this charge is an insidious, unscientific and illegal allegation. Everyone familiar with social science and history knows that classes and segments exist in every capitalist society not as a result of the aspirations of a political party but as a result of historical development. If there were

no classes and segments in a society and if their economic and political interests were not different, we would have neither different political parties, nor contentions for government, nor government changes, nor different political programs. If the prosecution looks at any government program at random, it will see that they, too, make these 'categoric distinctions' and that each one makes different promises for different expectations."

Referring to the charge that the TSIP wanted the annulment of articles 141 and 142 of the Turkish Penal Code, Ozden said that the indictment itself mentions that these articles were borrowed from the Italian penal code, that these articles have been subjects of serious controversy and that the Republican People's Party and National Salvation Party coalition even submitted a bill to the Assembly to have these two articles abolished.

Referring to charges of collaboration with DISK [Confederation of Revolutionary Worker Unions], TOB-DER [Turkish Teachers' Unity and Solidarity Organization] and other professional organizations, Ozden said:

"One of the illegitimate grounds used to charge us with crimes is the fact that some of our colleagues who served in administrative positions in the party also served in organizations such as DISK and the Peace Council. I do not know about any laws which ban such activities. For example, I know many individuals who were elected deputies to the Assembly from the Justice Party, the Republican People's Party and the National Salvation Party and who served in labor unions parallel to their activities within their respective parties. As a matter of fact, today the Secretary General of Turk-Is [Turkish Confederation of Labor] is a member of the cabinet. This being the case, is it possible to say that a democratic organization is an affiliate of a political party on grounds that an administrator of that party served in the administration of that democratic organization? This is what the indictment implies. There can be nothing legal about such a charge; this charge can only be a baseless political accusation.

"The prosecution has brought charges against us on the basis of our official communications with the Turkish Labor Party. Apart from the fact that there is no law banning collaboration between political parties, the honorable prosecutor himself has, during his criticism of the past conditions, referred to the lack of cooperation between the Republican People's Party and the Justice Party. Parties cannot enter elections on a joint ticket, but apart from that they can undertake any type of political cooperation. Two parties can even merge just as the Justice Party and the Democratic Party did. That being the case, there is nothing secret about our communications with the Turkish Labor Party. In fact these communications have been published in the press."

9588

CSO: 3554/47

## OZYORUK EYES FRAMING OF NEW ELECTORAL LAW

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 4 November 82 p 9

[ "Your Decision" column by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "Electoral Law Is a Different Matter" ]

[Text] It is obvious that the first two issues to be tackled after the draft constitution is approved at the referendum are the laws about political parties and elections. Neither of these laws bear any similarities to the constitution. They are different for the following reason:

At the time when applications were still being accepted for the Consultative Assembly and press columns only guessed about the identities of prospective Assembly members, some writers were insistent on one viewpoint: They wanted to see "former politicians" in this assembly which would prepare the new constitution. They charged that this was an absolute necessity and were surprised, to say the least, at those who were skeptical about the idea or who did not agree with it. The proponents of this idea thought that former politicians had "constitutional experience," that, for years, they "implemented" the constitution and that, consequently, in the drafting of a new constitution, they would be able to tell what the correct path would be and what the defects of the old constitution were so that the same mistakes would not be made in the new one. Only the "former politicians" could answer these issues.

Personally, I never subscribed to that viewpoint; I was even irritated whenever I read it. The hypothesis that a politician implements the constitution is a concept that is too readily accepted. What in the constitution does the politician implement? Nothing. The "formation of the parliament in accordance with the constitution" is not a "particularity" of the parliament; all government organs and branches exist by the authority of the constitution. Furthermore, parliament is not a body that determines its own existence; its existence is determined by the "Supreme Electoral Council." "Implementing" a law or a principle of jurisprudence first means "interpreting" that law or principle. Every legal implementation means, without exceptions, interpretation which may be very rough or very strict. Interpretation clarifies a legal principle and determines its content. The implementation of the principle is, then, the "evaluation" of situations and relations of conflict which have been scientifically and correctly analyzed. Sometimes, even the most able jurists are unable to tackle this "legal procedure." I have never understood how an individual who is not a jurist or

whose legal expertise is colored and bent by the fact that he is a "politician" can be viewed as having acquired "expertise" in a matter which demands top talent in the science and technique of law simply because he has served for four, eight or eighteen years in the Assembly. I have always been astonished about the myth that "politicians know the constitution best," and I have concluded that the proponents of this myth themselves have no understanding of the concepts of constitution and politics. Those who "know the constitution best" or rather those "who are required to know the constitution best" are the members of the Constitutional Court, other supreme justices and the experts on government law. But I think that the viewpoint in question has been uttered so frequently that the former politicians themselves believe that they possess an expertise which they never thought they could have.

Now let us return to the laws about political parties and elections. The same viewpoint will be expressed in connection with the law on political parties. Political experience may be necessary for this law on a few simple matters. But that is not the case with the electoral law. Once a number of major political choices are made the most capable experts on this issue are the politicians who have experienced the various intricacies of the election mechanism. Even the most talented legal experts of the world cannot find the loopholes in electoral laws. No one but an old "election fox" can evaluate an election mechanism which must be designed with extreme care and set on a strong legal base. The Consultative Assembly must never lose sight of this fact.

9588  
CSO: 3554/48

## OZYORUK EXAMINES RESPONSIBILITY OF NEW POLITICIAN

Istanbul TERCUMAN in Turkish 9 Nov 82 p 9

[ "Your Decision" column by Mukbil Ozyoruk: "That Is All" ]

[Text] When the latest figures were broadcast on television before I went to bed last night not even half the votes were counted. According to those figures the approval rate was 92 percent. By morning almost all the votes were counted. Almost 90 percent of the returns were in with very slight differences in various parts of the country. Those latest figures indicated that 91.36 percent of the valid votes were in favor of the constitution.

Therefore, it would not be imprudent to say that this issue has been "finalized" as these lines are being written and that the 1982 Constitution has received the endorsement of more than 90 percent of the nation. May God make it auspicious for the country.

Everyone knows under what conditions the 1961 Constitution was prepared 21 years ago and who supported it at the referendum. The approval rate for that constitution did not exceed 61.73 percent. Compare the two figures without forgetting what forces and groups tried to have the 1982 Constitution rejected and what alliances were formed and operated for that purpose.

Our nation spoke with "one voice" for the first time since 12 September 1980. Until 7 November 1982, the nation listened, looked, saw and thought for 2 years and 2 months. Many people talked and wrote on their own account. In the end, the nation gave its verdict silently and calmly. I hope that we will not have a group of hardheads who will come out in the future and say: "It would be different if we too were given a chance to address the people." No suggestion or propaganda effort that could affect the outcome of this referendum has escaped the people's attention. Those who will say "we were not given a chance" must express happiness "on the side" and thank God for "not being given a chance." The Honorable [Head of State Gen Kenan] Evren's words during his tours to promote the Constitution and on television will not be forgotten for years to come. The Honorable Evren would say what he has said and would ask the questions he has asked even if these people were given a chance. I will be as curious in the future as I have been until 7 November about how those who will dare to say that they "were not given a chance to speak" would answer to Evren's questions. Evren's questions have gone on "history's register." Those who will charge that they were not given a

say today on various alleged pretexts can answer those questions in the future. Did not Evren tell the people what these people were saying against 12 September? Did not "special messengers" disseminate all their suggestions throughout the country? Nothing has remained a secret from the citizenry.

Given these facts, the only meaning that can be ascribed to the fact that the new constitution has been approved by better than a 90 percent majority is: "We like this constitution and accept General Evren as our president."

I have a strong impression that the citizen has not just endorsed a constitution and a president, but that he has condemned and rejected "ugly politicking," the distasteful "mentality of politics" and the overall "character of the politician." Because it has been found that political influences which were supposed to "prevail" up to a certain point are nothing but big ciphers.

Therefore, those who will enter the political arena of this country from now on must accept and use "new standards and new yardsticks." It has become clear that "giving good marks to a politician in comparison to another" does not really mean anything to the citizen. The new politicians are obliged to "establish their values" not by being "compared to each other" but by serving the country.

9588  
CSO: 3554/48

MILITARY

DENMARK

BRIEFS

MILITARY ECONOMY MOVES--The Armed Forces will with immediate effect dis-  
continue nearly all travelling and participation in courses abroad. This  
is happening in response to a demand from the Ministry of Defense which  
wants the defense budget to be cut. In the same connection, it has been  
decided that officers shall no longer fly first class but the somewhat less  
expensive business class. The funds saved may be deducted from the defense  
budget, but this has not been finally decided. [Text] [Copenhagen  
BERLINGSKE TIDENDE in Danish 20 Nov 82 p 2] 7262

CSO: 3613/25

## PAPANDREOU, ARCHBISHOP REPORT ON IMPROVING CHURCH-STATE RELATIONS

Athens MESIMVRINI in Greek 12 Oct 82 p 4

[Text] During yesterday's meeting of the Standing Holy Synod, Archbishop Serafeim of Athens [and all Greece] pointed out that his meeting with Premier Andreas Papandreu (on 16 September) laid, for the first time in the church-state relations, the foundation for meaningful reciprocity and cooperation. At the same meeting the archbishop read an excerpt from the minutes of the Ministerial Council. According to this excerpt, Premier Papandreu, referring to his meeting with Archbishop Serafeim, told the Ministerial Council that:

- our relations with the Church are positive.
- I believe that the obstacles on the road to the solution of (the problems in) all issues, including the property issue, may be difficult but not impossible to overcome.
- The ministers, deputy ministers and remaining state officials should not create problems on issues related to the mission of the Church, but they should keep in touch with the minister of education.

Serafeim

On the other hand, referring to his meeting with the premier, Archbishop Serafeim stressed to the Holy Synod members the following:

- The Church is not tied up to the State; however, it needs it because although self-governed the Church is not autonomous. It is towards this goal we aim at.
- I call on the wisdom of all of you to help avoid problems and to assure in the future the principle of reciprocity in the relations between the Church and the State - manifestedly and clearly a reciprocity the premier defined.

## State-Church Relations

After the opening of the Holy Synod meeting yesterday, Archbishop Serafeim made public the following excerpt from the minutes of the Ministerial Council meeting dated September 16, 1982.

Premier: I would like to say two words about the subject of the relations between the State and the Church.

I had the opportunity to meet with His Beatitude Archbishop Serafeim. Present at the meeting were the Minister of Education and my Legal Advisor G. Kasimatis and the legal advisor of the Church G. Lilaios.

I must say that our relations with the Church are positive. I do not intend to make any comments now. However, I can say, and I consider this to be very important, that we have found understanding and a spirit of cooperation on the part of the Church.

I would like now to refer specifically to two issues which the archbishop has brought to my attention among other matters:

There are certain issues that concern the Church. The first of them concerns some circulars which have been issued either by ministries, or by organizations controlled by the state, or by state enterprises dealing with subjects that concern the Church, as for example church attendance, prayers, etc.

I would like to ask that the ministers, deputy ministers and other state officials not to create problems on subjects related to the mission of the Church. I would ask ministers facing such issues to communicate with the minister of education who is the responsible official before the Ministerial Council on state-church issues. No initiatives should be taken without the knowledge of the minister of education.

Certainly, we are in a position to present our government's views and positions. I am requesting, however, that we do not handle the issues of the Church as they come under our jurisdiction without the concurrent opinion of the minister of education. In case of disagreement, the subject can be referred to the premier. I have given orders to my legal advisors to oversee the Church-State relations, and to keep me informed, after he has discussed the position of the Church with His Beatitude and his Legal Advisor G. Lilaios, with whom he cooperates very closely.

I am now addressing specifically the minister of the interior. One observes that the attitude of the monarchs on Church issues varies considerably. It would be very useful if the monarchs in trying to overcome some of the difficulties their administration is encountering avoided any conflict with the Church and its representatives. It is essential that there should exist a uniform stand on the part of the government and the state on all issues concerning our relations with the Church.

I would say that on subjects concerning the Church, the monarchs and even the ministers should not send circulars without prior consultation with the minister of education in order to avoid useless problems and friction. And, by "useless" I mean problems created without any good reason behind them and without a personal or government intention to create such problems in our relations with the Church, which should remain positive for the benefit of the nation. In this way efforts to politicize Church issues will be precluded; such issues should remain above politics.

It is possible to have disagreements when facing a serious problem. But if there are to be any disagreements, they should be on important and not on insignificant issues; provided, however, that both the Church and the government will have exerted every effort to avoid such disagreements.

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END